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Correlational studies have shown that trauma-related rumination
predicts chronic post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This study
aimed to experimentally test the hypothesis that rumination is
causally involved in the development and maintenance of PTSD
symptoms. A video depicting the aftermath of serious road trafﬁc
accidents was used as an analogue stressor. After having watched
the video, N¼ 101 healthy participants were randomly assigned to
a guided thinking task designed to induce (a) rumination,
(b) memory integration and (c) distraction. In line with the
hypotheses, rumination led to less recovery from sad mood
triggered by the video than the other two conditions. In addition,
self-reported state levels of rumination during the guided thinking
task predicted subsequent intrusive memories in the session.
However, no signiﬁcant main effect of the experimental manipu-
lation on intrusive memories of the video was found. Results of
exploratory analyses suggested possible sex differences in the way
the processing manipulations were effective. Taken together, the
results partially support the hypothesis that rumination is involved
in the maintenance of negative mood and post-traumatic stress
symptoms.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.ment of Clinical Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018
6858; fax: þ31 20 6391369.
e (U. Zetsche), t.w.a.ehring@uva.nl (T. Ehring), anke.ehlers@iop.kcl.ac.uk
niversity of Marburg, Germany.
C BY license.
U. Zetsche et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 40 (2009) 499–5145001. Introduction
Themajority of individuals who experience traumatic events such as a violent assault or severe road
trafﬁc accidents report symptoms of distress in the immediate aftermath (e.g. Kleim, Ehlers, &
Glucksman, 2007; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002). While some trauma survivors then go on to
experience persistent symptoms of sufﬁcient severity to warrant a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), a signiﬁcant proportion recover after a few weeks or months. For example, in the
Detroit Area Survey of Trauma 25% of individuals meeting PTSD criteria (except duration criterion) in
the weeks after the trauma had recovered at 6 months follow-up whereas 70% still met criteria after
a year (Breslau et al., 1998). This raises the question of what factors contribute to the maintenance of
the disorder.
A number of theorists have suggested that rumination about the trauma and/or its consequences is
an important factor involved in the development and maintenance of post-traumatic stress symptoms
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Joseph,Williams, & Yule,1995;Wells, 2000). In linewith this
view, a cross-sectional study of ambulance service workers found rumination to be signiﬁcantly related
to PTSD symptom severity as well as a measure of general mental health (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; for
similar results see Ehring, Frank, & Ehlers, 2008; Michael, Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2007; Steil & Ehlers,
2000). In addition, a series of prospective longitudinal studies with survivors of road trafﬁc accidents or
assaults identiﬁed rumination in the immediate aftermath of the trauma as one of the strongest
predictors of PTSD symptom severity at 6 months and 1 year, even when initial symptom levels were
controlled (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2008; Kleim et al., 2007;
Michael et al., 2007; Murray et al., 2002). Interestingly, Michael et al. (2007) found that ruminationwas
not unique to assault survivors with PTSD but was also reported by individuals without the disorder.
However, the authors were able to identify speciﬁc characteristics of rumination that were closely
linked to PTSD severity, namely engagement in ‘‘why’’ and ‘‘what if’’ type questions as well as
unproductive circular thinking. In summary, there is evidence suggesting that rumination exacerbates
post-traumatic stress symptoms. However, all of the above results are based on correlational data.
Therefore, experimental studies are needed to test the hypothesized causal relationship.
Two earlier experimental studies investigated the effect of worry on intrusive images in the context
of general anxiety disorder (Butler,Wells, & Dewick,1995;Wells & Papageorgiou,1995). In both studies,
student participants were presented a distressing ﬁlm and then asked to either worry about the ﬁlm
and its implications in a verbal form, engage in imagery about the ﬁlm and its implications, or merely
settle down. In both studies, worrying led to signiﬁcantlymore intrusive images about the ﬁlm than the
control conditions. As worry and rumination have been found to share a number of important process
characteristics (Ehring &Watkins, 2008), results from these studies can be seen as indirect evidence for
a causal effect of rumination on intrusive memories. However, additional analyses in the Butler et al.
(1995) study revealed that there were no signiﬁcant group differences in the time spent worrying
during the induction period and that participants in the worry group actually reported more time
imaging the content of the ﬁlm than participants in the imagery or control group. It is thus not clear
whether the induction of worry was successful and which processes were responsible for the differ-
ences in intrusive memories. In order to clarify the relationship between rumination and PTSD
symptoms, studies are needed that induce trauma-related rumination with similar phenomenological
properties as those described in PTSD (e.g., Michael et al., 2007).
Little is known about the mechanisms by which rumination exacerbates post-traumatic stress
symptoms. It has been suggested that, like worry in generalized anxiety disorder (Borkovec, Shadick, &
Hopkins, 1990), rumination might be a form of cognitive avoidance, serving to distract from more
distressing cognitions, such as visual memories of the worst moments of the traumatic event (Ehlers &
Steil, 1995). This is in line with clinical observations showing that ruminative thoughts often take the
form of ‘why’ and ‘what if’ questions rather than focusing on the actual traumatic situation itself. In
their cognitive model of PTSD, Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggest three different pathways by which
rumination may contribute to PTSD symptoms. First, rumination is thought to prevent an elaboration
of the trauma memory and to hinder its integration into preceding and subsequent experiences and
other autobiographical memories, which has the consequence that cue-driven retrieval of intrusive
trauma memories is not sufﬁciently inhibited. Secondly, rumination is assumed to strengthen negative
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directly trigger symptoms such as feelings of nervous tension, dysphoria and hopelessness, and
because it provides internal retrieval cues, may also directly trigger intrusive memories. This propo-
sition is in accordance with recent results from depression research showing that rumination about
depressive symptoms exacerbates negative affect, prolongs depressive episodes, and interferes with
successful problem solving (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Thomsen,
2006). In addition, Michael et al. (2007) found that negative affect during and after rumination was
linked to PTSD severity. The present study therefore aimed to investigate the effect of rumination on
negative affect as well as intrusive memories. Since it has been shown that intrusive memories are
often triggered by stimuli bearing similar physical characteristics to stimuli signalling the moments of
strongest emotional impact (Ehlers et al., 2002), the present study assessed spontaneously occurring
memories as well as memories triggered by matching visual and acoustic stimuli.
Effective treatments of PTSD such as trauma-focused cognitive behaviour therapy (TF-CBT) and
eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) aim to reduce re-experiencing by system-
atically recounting the traumatic experience or elements of it (see Bisson et al., 2007 for a review).
TF-CBT interventions such as repeated imaginal exposure to the trauma (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998) or
writing a detailed account of the event (Resick & Schnicke, 1993) aim to systematically transform the
fragmented recall of the trauma into a coherent narrative. Similarly, Ehlers and Clark (2000) sug-
gested that in order to reduce re-experiencing, the trauma memory needs to be elaborated. In
particular, they suggest that the worst moments of the trauma memory need to be linked in
treatment with relevant preceding and subsequent autobiographical experiences that put the
meaning of these moments into context (e.g., linking the moment where the person thought that
they were never going to see their children again with recent memories of playing with their
children that signify to them that they survived the event). In an experimental study, Michael and
Ehlers (2007) used a structured writing task to promote such autobiographical memory elaboration
and integration after exposure to an analogue stressor. As expected, participants in the memory
integration condition subsequently reported fewer intrusive memories than participants in
a distraction control condition.
The aim of the present study was to experimentally investigate the effects of rumination on
analogue PTSD symptoms, using a distressing video depicting real life footage of the aftermath of
road trafﬁc accidents as the stressor. Earlier studies have shown the usefulness and validity of the
trauma ﬁlm paradigm for studying the development and modulation of analogue PTSD symptoms
(for a review see Holmes & Bourne, 2008). This study further aimed to extend earlier ﬁndings on
worry by Butler et al. (1995) and Wells and Papageorgiou (1995) by explicitly inducing trauma-
related rumination. Furthermore, the study included two control conditions, a distraction condition,
and a condition designed to promote autobiographical memory integration. It was hypothesized that
(1) participants in the rumination condition will experience less recovery from sad and fearful mood
than participants in the distraction or memory integration conditions, (2) participants in the
rumination condition will experience more intrusive memories from the video than participants in
the distraction or memory integration conditions, whereas participants in the memory integration
condition will experience fewer intrusive memories than those in the control condition, and (3)
levels of state rumination across all conditions will be positively associated with the number of
intrusive memories.2. Method
2.1. Overview
Participants ﬁrst watched a distressing video showing the aftermath of road trafﬁc accidents (RTAs).
The video was followed by a computer-based manipulation of post-exposure processing. Participants
were randomly allocated, stratiﬁed by sex, to one of three experimental processing conditions:
rumination, memory integration, or distraction. The study assessed the effects of the manipulation on
mood and intrusive memories during the session and the following week.
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One hundred and one volunteers participated in the study. Exclusion criteria were previous trau-
matic experiences (including any severe road trafﬁc accidents that participants may have experienced),
current depression, current blood/injury phobia, or insufﬁcient knowledge of English to answer
questionnaires. Sample characteristics are shown in Table 1.
2.3. Materials and tasks
2.3.1. Road trafﬁc accident video
Avideo comprising eight scenes of real life footage fromroad trafﬁc accidents (depicting dead bodies,
injured people, and emergency personnel at work) served as the analogue ‘traumatic’ stressor. Each
scenewas brieﬂy introduced byamale voice providing context information. A former version of the RTA
video developed by Steil (1997) has been shown to reliably induce negative mood and analogue post-
traumatic stress symptoms, such as intrusive memories (e.g. Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002;
Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004). For the current study, some older German footage was replaced
with more recent footage shot in the UK. The resulting video lasted 17 min and 30 s and was presented
on a 9370 cm TV screen. Participants sat in a comfortable armchair about 2 m from the screen.
2.3.2. Post-video processing manipulation
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three post-video processing conditions, stratiﬁed by
sex. All conditions had in common that participants were instructed to think about sentences
presented on a computer screen. The sentences and their presentation scheme varied according to the
experimental condition as speciﬁed below.
All post-video processing conditions lasted 12 min and were interrupted at four ﬁxed times when
participants were asked towrite down some notes about what had been on their minds in the previous
interval to allow for assessments of compliance. As a manipulation check, the notes for participants in
the rumination andmemory integration conditionwere subsequently rated by two independent ratersTable 1
Sample description.
Total (N¼ 101)
M (SD) or N(%)
Rumination
(n¼ 32)
M (SD) or N(%)
Memory integration
(n¼ 35)
M (SD) or N(%)
Control
(n¼ 34)
M (SD) or N(%)
Statistics
Age 24.38 (5.98) 23.69 (4.54) 24.00 (6.14) 25.41 (6.98) F (2, 97)¼ .79,
p¼ .46, h2¼ .02
Sex Male 30 (29.7%) 8 (25.0%) 12 (34.3%) 10 (29.4%) c2 (2,101)¼ .69,
p¼ .71, h2¼ .08Female 71 (70.3%) 24 (75.0%) 23 (65.7%) 24 (70.6%)
Ethnic background Caucasian 69 (68.3%) 23 (71.9%) 24 (68.6%) 22 (64.7%) c2 (2,101)¼ .39,
p¼ .82, h2¼ .06Other 32 (31.7%) 9 (28.1%) 11 (31.4%) 12 (35.3%)
Native speaker Yes 87 (86.1%) 30 (93.8%) 29 (82.9%) 28 (82.4%) ci2 (2,101)¼ 2.28,
p¼ .32, h2¼ .15No 14 (13.9%) 2 (6.2%) 6 (17.1%) 6 (17.6%)
Frequency
of driving
Never 44 (43.6%) 16 (50.0%) 15 (44.1%) 13 (38.2%) ci2 (2,101)¼ 1.72,
p¼ .79, h2¼ .13<5 times
per month
30 (29.7%) 10 (31.3%) 10 (29.4%) 10 (29.4%)
>5 times
per month
26 (25.8%) 6 (18.7%) 9 (26.5%) 11 (32.4%)
Hours watching
medical TV
5.9 (6.0) 7.2 (7.2) 5.6 (6.0) 5.0 (4.7) F (2,98)¼ 1.16,
p¼ .32, h2¼ .02
Depression (BDI) 4.8 (4.9) 4.8 (5.6) 4.8 (4.8) 4.9 (4.3) F (2,98)¼ .00,
p¼ 1.00, h2¼ .00
Anxiety (STAI-T) 35.7 (9.6) 35.1 (9.4) 35.6 (9.4) 36.4 (10.2) F (2,98)¼ .14,
p¼ .87, h2¼ .00
Trait Rumination
(RSQ)
39.1 (11.3) 37.8 (11.7) 39.6 (10.9) 39.8 (11.6) F (2,98)¼ .32,
p¼ .73, h2¼ .01
BDI¼ Beck Depression Inventory; STAIT¼ State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait version; RSQ¼ Response Style Questionnaire.
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teristic of ruminative thinking: repetitiveness (deﬁned as repeated thoughts concerned with the same
issue; see Ehring &Watkins, 2008), unproductiveness (deﬁned as ‘‘why’’- and ‘‘what if’’- questions and
other thoughts that are not solution-oriented; see Michael et al., 2007), catastrophizing (deﬁned as
thoughts focused on worst case outcomes; Borkovec, Ray, & Sto¨ber, 1998) and abstractness (deﬁned as
thinking that is indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, unclear and aggregated; see Watkins, 2008, for
a review of theoretical and empirical work indicating that abstractness is a key dimension
distinguishing dysfunctional rumination from functional forms of processing). Each dimension was
rated on a 5-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). Intraclass correlation coefﬁcients computed
to establish interrater reliabilities were .75 (repetitiveness), .77 (catastrophizing), .83 (abstractness),
and .91 (unproductiveness).
2.3.2.1. Rumination condition. This condition aimed to induce rumination about the video. Participants
saw sentences representing ruminative thoughts related to the video on the screen and were
instructed to ﬁrst read the sentence silently and then to think about a concern or a question the
sentence might bring up, dwell on its implications, or drift to related issues and follow associated
thoughts. Participants were instructed to bring their attention back to the sentence whenever they
found themselves thinking about something completely unrelated to the task. They moved on to the
next sentence by pressing a button when they felt they had thought enough about a sentence.
The ruminative sentences were chosen to resemble the form (e.g. ‘‘why’’ and ‘‘what if’’ questions)
and content of ruminative thoughts reported by RTA survivors with PTSD. For this purpose, a pool of
ruminative sentences had been rated by eight therapists specialized in cognitive behavioural
treatment of PTSD. Only sentences that had been rated as highly representative of ruminative
thoughts typically reported by PTSD patients were included into the task (e.g. ‘Why do people have
to drive that recklessly?’, ‘Would I ever be able to be the same person as before?’, ‘How can I drive
again without thinking about what could happen?’). A total of 72 ruminative sentences representing
14 trauma-related ruminative topics were selected, with four to seven sentences in each group of
topics (see Appendix).
To increase the personal relevance of the rumination sentences, participants were only presented
with sentences from topic groups that applied to them. These were identiﬁed with a short question-
naire prior to the manipulation task. The questionnaire contained one representative item from each
topic group and participants were asked to rate howmuch each sentence applied to them after having
seen the video. For each participant, the seven topics with the highest ratings on the questionnaire
were chosen for the rumination task. During the rumination task, the respective rumination sentences
were presented on the computer screen one at a time, organized by topic.
2.3.2.2. Memory integration condition. This condition aimed to promote the processing of the ﬁlm
material by asking participants to think about their experience in a self-referential and chronological
way. Participants were consecutively presented with seven sets of two to four questions on the
computer screen. They were instructed to ﬁrst read the set of questions silently and then spend the
following time thinking about the questions and answering them in their own minds.
The questions were adapted from the writing task used by Michael and Ehlers (2007) to promote
autobiographical memory integration by (a) linking the experience of the video to the chronological
sequence of events on the same day, and by (b) distinguishing the video from the person’s own
nontraumatic experiences with road trafﬁc. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst set of questions asked participants to
think about what they had done and how they had felt before coming to the session. The second set
enquired whether the experiment hadmatched the participant’s expectations. The third and fourth set
of questions asked them to think back to the video, judge which scenes they found most unpleasant
and why and how the scenes were similar or different to own experiences. The ﬁfth set of questions
asked participants to think about their own experiences on the road, especially those that they ﬁnd
enjoyable and in which they feel safe. The sixth set of questions asked participants to think about
whether they expect the experiment to change their feeling of safety on the road. Finally, the last set of
questions asked participants to think about their plans for the rest of the day. Each set of questions was
presented for a ﬁxed amount of time.
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while demanding a similar amount of concentration and verbal activity as the other two tasks.
Participants were presented with quiz questions on the computer screen asking them to recall as many
members of a certain category as possible (e.g. ‘Please try to recall as many African countries/ London
boroughs/ US presidents as you can think of’). Participants were instructed to ﬁrst read each question
silently and then spend some time thinking about it and answering it in their own minds. Quiz
questions were presented one at a time and remained on the screen until participants proceeded to the
next question by pressing the left mouse button.
2.4. Dependent variables
2.4.1. Intrusive memories of the video
2.4.1.1. Intrusive Memory Questionnaire (IMQ). Intrusive memories of the video were assessed with an
adapted version of the IMQ (Michael & Ehlers, 2007). This questionnaire deﬁnes intrusive memories as
‘‘images, sounds or thoughts representing things that were shown, or memories of thoughts/feelings you
had while watching the accident scenes’’. Participants are asked to indicate the number of times such
memories had popped into their mind during the prior 2 min interval and note this number on the
questionnaire. They were instructed not to count any memories they had recalled deliberately.
2.4.1.2. Spontaneous and triggered intrusions during the session. The IMQ was used to assess spontaneous
as well as triggered intrusive memories. Spontaneous intrusive memories were assessed during two
2 min resting periods; ﬁrst, after the experimental manipulation task and second, at the very end of the
session. The sum of the number of intrusions during these two periods was used as the measure of
spontaneous intrusive memories.
The ease with which intrusive memories can be triggered by matching cues was assessed by
showing participants a 3 min sequence of stimuli that were taken from the same source of footage as
the video, but did not overlap with any part of the video. There were ﬁve still images (10 s each) and
three acoustic samples (20 s each). All stimuli were separated by a 10 s interval without images or
sounds to allow time for possible intrusive memories to emerge. Images were presented on the same
9370 cm screen as the video. Participants reported on the IMQ how many intrusive memories were
triggered during the exposure to these probes (triggered intrusive memories).
2.4.1.3. Seven day diary. Participants completed a daily diary during theweek following the experimental
session. The diary comprised seven copies of the IMQ. Participantswere asked to ﬁll out one copyeachday
before going to bed. On the seventh day, participants additionally completed a copy of the PANAS-X
(see below). The number of intrusive memories during the week was calculated from the diary entries.
2.4.2. Mood
Parts of the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form (PANAS-X, Watson & Clark,
1994) assessed participants’ mood. Participants are asked to rate 32 adjectives describing mood states
on a scale from 1 (very slightly) to 5 (extremely) according to how they are feeling in that particular
moment. In order to reduce the number of analyses, only scores for the subscales ‘sadmood’ and ‘fearful
mood’were calculated. The PANAS-X scales have proved to be sensitive to stress, and physical and social
activity (Watson & Clark, 1994). In the present sample, internal consistencies were satisfactory; fearful
mood: a¼ .68–.89, sad mood: a¼ .75–.85. Participants completed the PANAS-X four times: before and
after seeing the video, after the processing manipulation during the session, and again after 7 days.
2.5. Additional questionnaire measures
2.5.1. Socio-demographic variables
A seven-item General Information Questionnaire (GIQ) was used to assess demographic variables,
such as date of birth, gender, ethnic background, ﬁrst language, marital status, employment status and
qualiﬁcations.
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with past traumatic experiences, psychotic symptoms, current depression and blood phobia.
Furthermore, items assessing usual time watching medical programs and driving frequency were
included.
2.5.2. Trait measure of rumination
The 22-item Rumination Scale of the Response Style Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow, 1991) was used to check for any pre-manipulation differences in participants’ general
tendency to ruminate in response to negativemood. Participants are asked to indicate on a scale from 1
(almost never) to 4 (almost always) how often they think or behave in a certain way when they feel
depressed (e.g. Think about how passive and unmotivated I feel). Previous studies have shown good test-
retest reliability and acceptable convergent and predictive validity (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991;
Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larsen, 1994). The internal consistency in this study was a¼ .93.
2.5.3. Depression and anxiety
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) is a widely used 21-item self-
report measure of depression severity with good reliability and validity (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988).
Internal consistency in this study was a¼ .84.
The State and Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait subscale (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, &
Jacobs, 1983) is a widely used 20-item self-report measure of trait anxiety that has shown good
reliability and validity (Spielberger et al., 1983). Internal consistency in this study was a¼ .92.
2.5.4. Manipulation checks
The Video Questionnaire (VQ) comprises one item assessing the distress evoked by the video (rated
on a scale from 1 to 100).
The Processing Manipulation Check Questionnaire (PMCQ) comprises a total of three items, which
were analyzed separately. The ﬁrst item assesses participants’ ability to concentrate on the task by
asking how much of the time they were able to think about the questions presented (0–100%). The
second item asks participants how distressing they found the task (0¼ not at all to 100¼ extremely).
The last item assesses the extent to which participants felt driven to continue thinking about the
accident scenes (0¼ not at all to 4¼ very much).
The Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire-State Version (PTQ-S) is a self-report measure of state
rumination. The questionnaire was designed by the authors to assess the process of rumination
independent of its speciﬁc content. This is based on the assumption that the negative outcomes of
rumination are not only determined by its content, but by the characteristic style of thinking. The PTQ
comprises 20 items assessing the level of repetitiveness (e.g. The same thoughts keep coming back to my
mind again and again), unproductiveness (e.g. My thoughts do not result in any conclusions) and
uncontrollability (e.g. I can’t stop dwelling on certain issues) of thoughts. In this study, the PTQ was
employed to assess state rumination. For this purpose, participants were asked to indicate on a 5-point
scale (labelled as never to almost always) to what extent each statement applied to them while thinking
about the sentences presented on the screen. The PTQ has been found to possess good psychometric
properties (Ehring, 2007). Internal consistency in this study was a¼ .89.
The Memory Integration Processing Questionnaire (MIPQ) was developed by the authors to evaluate
the degree of elaborative, chronologically structured processing of the ﬁlm material. It comprises 11
items in the form of statements (e.g. ‘My thoughts followed a coherent structure’, ‘I thought about the
accident scenes with reference to my life’, ‘I associated the experiment with today’s activities’) that are rated
on a scale from 0 (I never thought this way) to 4 (I almost always thought this way). Internal consistency
in this study was a¼ .83.
2.6. Procedure
Oneweek prior to the study session, participants received an information sheet and a questionnaire
package including the RSQ, BDI, and STAI-T. They were asked to bring the completed questionnaires to
the session.
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purpose and procedure of the study and gave written informed consent. Participants then
completed the PEQ and baseline PANAS-X. Next, the RTA video was presented. Following the video,
participants’ mood was reassessed (PANAS-X). Participants were then allocated to one of the three
processing conditions. After completing the experimental manipulation task, the manipulation
check questionnaires and the third mood rating (PANAS-X) were administered. Participants then
had a 2-min rest period, after which they ﬁlled in the ﬁrst IMQ about spontaneous intrusive
memories. Next, the probes for triggering intrusions were presented and participants ﬁlled in an
IMQ about triggered intrusive memories. After a further 2-min rest period, participants ﬁlled in the
second IMQ about spontaneous intrusive memories. At the end of the session, the experimenter
gave the participants the seven day diary (including the ﬁnal PANAS-X), which they ﬁlled in during
the following week and then returned by mail. The response rate for the follow-up questionnaires
was 96% (N¼ 97). The experimenter made sure that participants felt well before leaving and
encouraged them to contact her if they felt distressed about the experiment in any way. No
participant took up this option.
Study sessions lasted 1.5 h on average and participants received £ 20 as a compensation for their
time and travel expenses. The study was approved by the local Research Ethics Committee.
2.7. Data analyses
Differences between the three conditions on manipulation check measures and intrusive memories
were tested with one-way ANOVAs with the factor Condition. Changes in mood were tested with two-
way repeated measures ANOVAs with Condition as the between-subjects factor and Time (before
versus after video; before versus after experimental manipulation) as the within-subject factor.
Signiﬁcant main effects of Condition were further explored using simple contrasts.
The relationship between processing styles and intrusive memories was assessed by calculating
correlations across the entire sample. Due to highly skewed intrusionmeasures Spearman’s correlation
coefﬁcient for ranked data (Spearman’s rho) was used.
All statistical analyses were computed using SPSS version 12.0.1 for Windows and a signiﬁcance
level of a¼ .05 was used in all analyses.
3. Results
3.1. Baseline group differences
As to be expected with random assignment, participants in the three conditions did not differ in
any of the demographic variables or other measures prior to the experimental manipulation (see
Table 1).
3.2. Manipulation checks
3.2.1. Effects of video on mood
On average, participants rated the video as moderately distressing;M¼ 56, SD¼ 18, on a scale from
0 to 100. Condition did not affect the video-related distress, F(2, 98)¼ .86, p¼ .43, h2¼ .02. As shown in
Table 2, the video signiﬁcantly increased PANAS-X ratings of sadness, F (1, 97)¼ 209.2, p< .001,
h2¼ .68, and fear, F(1, 97)¼ 45.5, p< .001, h2 ¼ .32. No signiﬁcant Time Condition interaction effects
were found, showing that participants in the different conditions experienced a similar increase in
negative affect, F’s(2, 97)< .85, p> .43, h2< .02.
3.2.2. Manipulation checks for experimental manipulation
Results for the manipulation checks are shown in Table 3. Participants in the three conditions did
not differ regarding their concentration on the induction task. However, as expected, perceived distress
during the manipulation task was signiﬁcantly lower in the control condition than in the rumination
and memory integration conditions, which did not differ from each other. In addition, participants in
Table 2













Variables assessed during the session
Sadness 1. Pre-video 1.08 (.18) 1.04 (15) 1.09 (17) 1.10 (.22)
2. Post-video 1.80 (.60) 1.84 (.63) 1.74 (.63) 1.83 (.54)
3. Post-manipulation 1.38 (.51) 1.58 (.53) 1.34 (.56) 1.24 (.36)
Fear 1. Pre-video 1.23 (.28) 1.20 (.24) 1.25 (.32) 1.23 (.28)
2. Post-video 1.61 (.66) 1.61 (.74) 1.53 (51) 1.71 (.73)
3. Post-manipulation 1.27 (.46) 1.35 (.57) 1.25 (.43) 1.22 (.37)
Intrusive memories 1. Spontaneous 6.1 (5.84) 6.4 (5.21) 5.9 (5.48) 6.0 (6.83)
2. Triggered 7.6 (6.34) 7.0 (5.71) 8.6 (7.27) 7.2 (5.94)
Variables assessed during the following week
Intrusive memories 13.5 (13.90) 14.7 (12.04) 12.9 (14.44) 13.0 (15.26)
Sadness 1.43 (.52) 1.39 (.48) 1.44 (.51) 1.46 (.57)
Fear 1.31 (.46) 1.37 (.61) 1.23 (.27) 1.31 (.43)
U. Zetsche et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 40 (2009) 499–514 507the rumination group reported a stronger drive to continue dwelling on the video and higher state
rumination scores on the PTQ-S than the control group, and, as a trend, than participants in the
memory integration condition. For self-reported levels of memory integration processing assessed
with the MIPQ, participants in the memory integration condition reported signiﬁcantly higher levels of
memory integration than participants in both the rumination and the control condition.
As expected, independent raters’ blind evaluations of the content of thoughts reported in the short
breaks during the thinking task showed that participants in the rumination condition thought about
the video scenes in a more abstract, unproductive, repetitive, and catastrophizing way, than partici-















Concentration on task 84.0 (12.4) 83.3 (11.3) 82.6 (12.9) 86.0 (13.0) F(2, 95)¼ 1.79,
p¼ .17, h2¼ .04
Manipulation-related distress 24.9 (23.5) 32.2 (20.8) a 29.7 (25.1) a 13.1 (19.8) b F(2, 95)¼ 5.48,
p< .01, h2¼ .10
Drive to continue dwelling 2.2 (1.22) 2.5 (1.51) a 2.2 (1.03) b 1.9 (1.04) b F(2, 95)¼ 3.96,
p< .05, h2¼ .08
PTQ-S 27.8 (12.0) 32.1 (10.7) a 26.9 (12.6) b 24.5 (11.5) b F(2, 95)¼ 2.73,
p¼ .07, h2¼ .05
MIPQ 19.9 (7.9) 20.4 (5.2) a 25.4 (7.3) b 13.8 (6.3) c F(2, 95)¼ 27.51,
p< .001, h2¼ .37
Abstractness1 2.89 (.96) 2.07 (.81) t (59)¼3.65,
p< .01
Unproductiveness1 .69 (.92) .06 (.23) t (63)¼3.90,
p< .01
Repetitiveness1 .52 (.62) .20 (.38) t (63)¼2.50,
p< .05
Catastrophizing1 .56 (.72) .17 (.41) t (59)¼2.70,
p< .05
PTQ-S¼ Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire – State version; MIPQ¼Memory Integration Processing Questionnaire; different
superscripts denote differences between conditions at p< .05 or p< .10 if in parentheses.
1 Blind evaluations of thoughts reported in the short breaks during the thinking task.
U. Zetsche et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 40 (2009) 499–5145083.3. Main analyses
3.3.1. Effects of the experimental manipulation on mood
Means and standard deviations for sadness and fear at each assessment point are reported in Table
2. There were signiﬁcant main effects of Time on sadness, F(1, 98)¼ 87.96, p< .001, h2¼ .47, and fear,
F(1, 98)¼ 58.09, p< .001, h2¼ .37, showing that, on average, negative emotions decreased from post-
video to post-manipulation. In line with Hypothesis 1, the main effect of Time on sadness was
qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant ConditionTime interaction, F(2, 98)¼ 5.42, p< .01, h2¼ .10, which was
followed up by separate ANOVAs for each assessment point: Prior to the experimental manipulation,
there was no signiﬁcant effect of Condition on sadness, F(2, 98)¼ .30, p¼ .74, h2¼ .01, while there was
a signiﬁcant Condition effect at post-manipulation, F(2, 98)¼ 4.02, p< .05, h2¼ .08. As expected,
simple contrasts showed that participants in the rumination condition reported signiﬁcantly more
sadness than those in the control condition, p¼ .01. There was no signiﬁcant ConditionTime
interaction for fearful mood, F(2, 98)¼ 1.94, p¼ .15, h2¼ .04, nor a main effect of Condition, F(2,
98)¼ .08, p¼ .93, h2¼ .00.3.3.2. Effects of the experimental manipulation on intrusive memories during the session
Means and standard deviations for the reported number of spontaneous and triggered intrusive
memories are shown in Table 2. In contrast to Hypothesis 2, there were no main effects of Condition on
the number of spontaneous or triggered intrusive memories, both F’s< .47, both p’s> .63, both
h2’s< .01.
In exploratory analyses, the ANOVAs were re-run with Sex as an additional between-subjects
factor. Results showed signiﬁcant Condition Sex interactions for both spontaneous intrusive
memories, F(2, 95)¼ 4.69, p< .05, h2¼ .09, and triggered intrusive memories, F(2, 95)¼ 7.08,
p< .01, h2¼ .13. Follow-up tests were conducted for male and female participants separately.
Results showed that men in the rumination condition experienced signiﬁcantly more intrusive
memories (spontaneous memories: M¼ 7.3, SD¼ 5.13; triggered memories: M¼ 9.9, SD¼ 8.06),
than those in the memory integration condition (spontaneous memories: M¼ 2.1, SD¼ 2.97;
p< .01; triggered memories: M¼ 4.1, SD¼ 3.48, p< .05). Furthermore, men in the memory inte-
gration condition tended to experience fewer intrusive memories than those in the control
condition (spontaneous memories: M¼ 5.5, SD¼ 4.55, p< .05; triggered memories: M¼ 7.4,
SD¼ 4.43, p¼ .07). Men in the rumination and control conditions did not report different numbers
of intrusive memories, p’s> .37.
In contrast, women in the memory integration condition reported more triggered intrusive
memories (M¼ 10.9, SD¼ 7.67) than those in the rumination (M¼ 6, SD¼ 4.49) or control conditionsTable 4
Spearman rank correlations between state processing scores and the number of intrusive memories.
Spontaneous IM Triggered IM
State rumination (PTQ-S) Total .41** .25*
Female .46** .13
Male .24 .48**
Memory Integration Processing (MIPQ) Total .18 .16
Female .26* .26*
Male .07 .07
Memory Integration Processing, corrected




* p< .05; ** p< .01; þ p< .10.
PTQ-S¼ Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire – State version; MIPQ¼Memory Integration Processing Questionnaire;
IM¼ Intrusive Memories.
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differences for spontaneous intrusive memories in women, F(2, 68)¼ 1.54, p¼ .22, h2¼ .04.
3.3.3. Effects of the experimental manipulation on symptoms in the subsequent week
There were no signiﬁcant Condition or Time Condition effects on any dependent variable in the
week following the session, all F’s< 1, p’s> .65, all h2’s< .03.
3.3.4. Relationship between processing styles and intrusive memories
Table 4 shows the Spearman rank correlations between processing styles during the experimental
manipulation and intrusive memories. In line with Hypothesis 3, levels of state rumination across all
conditions correlated with the number of spontaneous and triggered intrusive memories in the
experimental session. However, therewere no signiﬁcant correlations between self-reports of memory
integration processing and intrusive memories in the experimental session.
Exploratory analyses again investigated possible sex differences. Results showed that state rumi-
nation was signiﬁcantly associated with spontaneous intrusive memories in females, r¼ .46, p< .001,
and triggered intrusive memories in males, r¼ .48, p< .001. Unexpectedly, in female participants, but
not males, levels of memory integration processing were also positively correlated with spontaneous
and triggered intrusive memories, both r’s¼ .26, both p’s< .01. Furthermore, memory integration
processing and state ruminationwere unexpectedly positively correlated inwomen, r¼ .28, p< .05, but
not in men, r¼.18, p¼ .33.
Thus, the memory integration processing questionnaire appeared to not speciﬁcally assess adaptive
processing. In order to generate a measure of memory integration processing that does not involve
elements of abstract, repetitive and uncontrollable thinking, z-transformed PTQ-S mean scores were
subtracted from z-transformed MIPQ mean scores for the entire sample. As shown in Table 4, memory
integration processing adjusted for rumination was negatively correlated with spontaneous intrusive
memories in the experimental session. The same pattern was found in the female subsample. In the
male subsample, adjusted memory integration processing showed a marginally signiﬁcant negative
correlation with triggered intrusive memories.
4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to experimentally investigate the effects of rumination on mood
and PTSD-like symptoms using an analogue design. It was hypothesized that experimentally induced
rumination following exposure to a distressing video would result in less recovery from negative affect
than the other two conditions. It was further hypothesized that ruminationwould increase the number
of intrusive memories from the video compared to memory integration processing or distraction. In
addition, the number of subsequent intrusive memories was expected to be positively associated with
levels of state rumination.
The video appeared to be sufﬁciently distressing to serve as a laboratory analogue for traumatic
events as it was rated as distressing by the participants, led to signiﬁcant increase in negativemood and
triggered on average 6.2 spontaneous and 7.8 triggered intrusive memories. Results from the manip-
ulation checks suggested that the experimental post-video processing manipulations were generally
successful in generating differentmental processes. The control groupwas clearly distinguishable from
the two processing condition groups, and reported less rumination, less memory integration pro-
cessing, and less distress. Thus, it appeared to effectively distract participants from further processing
the distressingmaterial from the video. The two active processing conditions were also distinguishable
in that participants in the rumination condition tended to report higher levels of rumination than those
in the memory integration condition, and participants in the memory integration condition reported
signiﬁcantly higher levels of memory integration processing than the rumination group.
In line with the ﬁrst hypothesis, participants in the rumination condition experienced less recovery
from sad mood than those in the memory integration and distraction conditions. This ﬁnding corre-
sponds to results from depression research showing that rumination in response to depressive mood
exacerbates negative affect, which can in turn contribute to the maintenance of depressive episodes
(Thomsen, 2006). Results from the present study suggest that PTSD-related rumination exerts similar
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speciﬁc to sadness. The lack of a Condition effect for fearful mood might be due to the particular
analogue stressor used in this study. The analogue stressor showed the aftermath of road trafﬁc
accidents, including a number of fatalities, and did not show accidents while they are happening. As
a consequence, participants may have predominantly reacted with sadness and only to a lesser degree
with fear. The video produced considerably greater sad mood than fearful mood, although the increase
from baseline to post video was highly signiﬁcant for both mood scales. Future studies will need to
investigate the effects of rumination on different mood states with other anxiety-provoking material.
The second hypothesis regarding the effect of rumination on intrusivememories was not supported.
No signiﬁcant effect of Condition on spontaneous or triggered intrusive memories was found. As earlier
research has reliably shown sex differences in the frequency and effects of rumination (e.g. Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991), exploratory analyses including sex as an additional factor were conducted and
revealed a signiﬁcant interaction between Condition and Sex. For men, results were largely in line with
the hypotheses: Men in the rumination condition experienced signiﬁcantly more spontaneous and
triggered intrusive memories than men in the memory integration condition, and the memory inte-
gration condition led to fewer intrusions than the control condition. Thus, processing the video in
a way that promoted memory integration appeared to reduce intrusive memories compared to both
rumination and distraction in men. However, unexpectedly, the opposite effect was found in women
for triggered intrusions: Women in the memory integration condition reported signiﬁcantly more
triggered intrusivememories than in the rumination or distraction condition and therewas no effect of
condition for spontaneous memories. Because of the small number of male participants in each
condition, these results need to be interpretedwith caution and need to be replicated before any strong
conclusions can be drawn. If replicated in future research, two explanations are conceivable: First, the
induced processing styles may have different effects in men and women. Second, the memory inte-
gration manipulation may not have worked as intended in women. The task was adapted from
awriting taskwith similar questions (Michael & Ehlers, 2007), but thewriting componentwas dropped
to make the task comparable to the rumination task. To promote helpful memory elaboration and
integration processing it may not be sufﬁcient in all cases to instruct participants just to think about the
questions. In addition, some of the questions used in the memory integration condition, for example
the question asking why participants found certain scenes of the video particularly distressing, may
have directly induced rumination rather than functional processing in rumination-prone individuals.
Future research is needed to decide between these alternative explanations.
Consistent with the third hypothesis, correlational analyses showed that the degree of state
rumination across all conditions was positively associated with the number of intrusive memories
following the experimental manipulation. Thus, there was correlational support for an effect on
rumination on subsequent intrusive memories, which is in line with the results of prospective studies
showing that rumination after trauma predicts subsequent PTSD symptoms (e.g., Ehring, Ehlers, et al.,
2008; Ehring, Frank, et al., 2008, Kleim et al., 2007; Murray et al., 2002). The results extend the earlier
studies by Butler et al. (1995) andWells and Papageorgiou (1995) onworry induction. In contrast to the
earlier studies, the content of the rumination induced by the experimental manipulationwas modelled
on that reported by patients with PTSD. Although levels of memory integration processing were not
related to intrusive memories in the total sample, an unexpected positive correlation emerged for
female participants only. In order to rule out the contamination of this measure by unproductive
ruminative thinking, we computed a new score of adaptive memory integration processing that does
not involve elements of abstract, repetitive and uncontrollable thinking. This measure of adaptive
memory integration processing adjusted for rumination was negatively associated with intrusive
memories in the entire sample, as well as in the female subsample. In sum, the current study provides
experimental evidence that trauma-related rumination leads to the maintenance of negative mood as
well as correlational evidence showing that intrusive memories are positively correlated with state
rumination and negatively correlated with levels of memory integration adjusted for rumination. The
results of the experimental manipulation of processing styles on intrusive memories were not
supportive of the hypotheses. Results of exploratory analyses suggested possible sex differences in the
way the processing manipulations were effective. The ﬁnding that the correlational analyses give
clearer support to the role of rumination inmaintaining intrusivememories than the comparison of the
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actually do during the experimental tasks appears to be more closely related to subsequent symptoms
than what the experimenter would like them to do.
A number of limitations are noteworthy. First, although the trauma ﬁlm paradigm is generally
accepted as a valid laboratory analogue for studying processes involved in the development and
maintenance of post-traumatic stress symptoms (Holmes & Bourne, 2008), it remains to be shown
whether the results generalize to rumination in survivors of real traumas. Second, the fact that the
video comprised several scenes from the aftermath of different road trafﬁc accidents may have caused
participants to take the perspective of onlookers instead of that of a trauma survivor. The present
ﬁndings might therefore more closely reﬂect the cognitive processes in witnesses of traumatic situa-
tions than those of individuals directly involved. Third, the reliance on the variables assessed in the
session may raise the questionwhether this study reveals information about the processes involved in
the maintenance of the disorder or rather in its development. In future research, the effect of rumi-
nation on the maintenance of symptoms could be tested more directly by inducing rumination about
the video repeatedly in the hours or days following the session. Another possible limitation of the study
concerns the fact that intrusive memories were assessed retrospectively following 2 min resting
intervals. Although similar measures have been used in earlier studies (e.g., Ehring, Szeimies,
& Schaffrick, 2009; Halligan et al., 2002; Salters-Pedneault, Vine, Mills, Park, & Litz, 2009; Wells
& Papageorgiou, 1995), the reliability and validity of this measure is unclear. An alternative way of
assessing intrusive memories would be to ask participants to count or signal these memories online as
they arise (see Davies & Clark, 1998). While this method avoids the problems related to retrospective
assessment, it comes at the cost that the monitoring process may inﬂuence the frequency of intrusive
memories it aims to measure. Future research should investigate the validity of the different ways of
assessing intrusive memories. Lastly, the low number of intrusive memories in the week following the
session resulted in restricted power for the analyses of the diary data. In order to increase the number
of intrusive memories in the days following the session, future studies may include a second exposure
to the reminders of the video after a few days.
Despite these limitations, the results of the current study support the role of trauma-related
rumination in the maintenance of post-traumatic stress symptoms. They also offer some support for
positive effects of processing that promotes the integration of trauma experiences with other auto-
biographical memory. More experimental research on these processes, and how they are different,
appears necessary.
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Appendix 1.
Ruminative sentences used for the rumination induction
Topic 1: Anger about existence of terrible events/unfair world
Why are so many accidents happening?
Terrible accidents like these happen every day.
Why is road trafﬁc dangerous?
Why do bad things happen mostly to innocent people?
Why do bad things have to happen?
Why can’t we undo such terrible events?
Topic 2: Trafﬁc anxiety: own perspective and victim’s perspective
How can I drive again without thinking about what could happen?
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How will I feel next time I am a passenger?
Could one ever rely on other road users again after experiencing such an accident?
Could one live on, without being scared of what will happen next?
Could one feel conﬁdent as a road user again after such an accident?
Topic 3: Worry about dangers to own life
Why can I never be sure that such an accident won’t happen to me?
I can never be sure what will happen next.
Bad things can happen at any moment.
I could die at any moment.
My life could be changed for the worse at any moment.
I could experience a bad event at any moment.
Topic 4: Relating video to own life
What if an accident like that happened to my loved ones?
What if that happened to me?
What if this had been my friend?
How must it be to get the message about the sudden death of your loved ones?
How must it be to hear your loved ones scream in pain?
Could I ever stop thinking of those who died in the accident?
Topic 5: Realizing dangerousness
Why have I never thought of what could happen when driving a car?
Why have I never realised that I could die at any moment?
Why have I never considered the fact that something terrible could happen at any moment?
Why have I never considered the fact that my life could be changed for the worse at any moment?
How could I have naively trusted other people giving me a lift in the past?
Why can I never rely on other road users to drive safely.
Topic 6: Perspective of a victim: stroke of fate
How horrible to have your life shattered so suddenly.
It must be awful to have your life suddenly changed for the worse.
One’s life can be ruined so quickly.
How would I feel about being crippled for the rest of my life?
Could I ever forgive what has been done to me, after experiencing such an accident?
How would I feel towards the people who did this to me?
How could I ever stop thinking ‘‘why me’’?
Topic 7: Anger about reckless driving/drivers
Why do people have to drive that recklessly?
Reckless drivers should be punished really severely.
Why should I have to depend on other road users to drive safely?
How can people be that irresponsible, driving to fast when giving someone a lift?
Why are people so reluctant to observe the speed limit?
Topic 8: Perspective of a victim: suffering pain
How slowly must time pass when you are trapped in a car, suffering from excruciating pain!
How would I be able to stand the pain, those injured people suffered?
Will the injured people ever forget thepain they sufferedwhilstwaiting for the paramedics to arrive?
How much pain must the injured people have experienced!
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Could they not have rescued the injured people more quickly?
Why do people have to suffer that much?
Why can’t we relieve injured people of their suffering?
How degrading it must be to lie almost naked in the middle of the accident site.
How embarrassing it must be to be in such a state in front of other people.
Topic 10: Consequences of accident for victims
Are the victims going to suffer from permanent disabilities?
Will the victims be able to get over this experience?
What has happened to the people who were injured?
Will the people who were injured ever recover completely?
Topic 11: Perspective of a victim: permanent change
How could I ever deal with such a stroke of fate?
Could I ever get back to normal life after such an experience?
How could I ever become happy again after such an experience?
Would I ever be able to be the same person as before?
Would I ever be able to cope with the experience of such an accident?
Topic 12: Perspective of person responsible for accident: dealing with guilt
Could I ever stop feeling guilty after causing an accident?
Could I ever overcome the fact that I killed someone?
How could I ever stop blaming myself after causing an accident?
Topic 13: Reﬂecting on own reaction to the video
Has my reaction to the ﬁlm been adequate?
Why can a simple video upset me?
Why can’t I get the moans of those injured people out of my mind?
Why can’t I stop thinking about how those injured people must have suffered?
Why do I have to watch such disgusting pictures?
Topic 14: Taking the perspective of a witness/ emergency service personal
How could one possibly become a paramedic, facing disgusting scenes every day?
If I witnessed such an accident, would I still be capable of helping?
How would I react at the site of an accident, seeing all the wounds and puddles of blood?
How would I deal with a real accident if just watching a ﬁlm has upset me?
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